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I. INTRODUCTION
Notwithstanding H. Ross Perot's strong third place finish in the
1992 Presidential election,' history suggests a successful presidential
candidate must be a member of one of the two major political parties to
win. As a result, many candidates compete for each major party's nom-
1. Ross Perot, an independent candidate, drew 19% of the popular vote, the best showing by
an independent or third-party candidate since Theodore Roosevelt received 27% while running on
the Bull Moose ticket in 1912. R. W. Apple, Jr., The 1992 Elections: President-Elect-The Over-
view; Clinton, Savoring Victory, Starts Sizing up Job Ahead, N. Y. Times Al (Nov. 5, 1992).
2. The most recent candidate to be elected president who did not run on the Democratic or
Republican ticket was Zachary Taylor, a Whig, in 1848. The World Almanac and Book of Facts
1992 425 (Pharos, 1991).
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ination.3 Moreover, the leaders of state Democratic and Republican
parties that hold presidential primaries often have attempted to remove
the lesser-known, and sometimes politically unpopular, candidates from
the ballot.
4
One argument advanced by state party leaders in support of their
attempts to prevent some candidates from appearing on the ballot is
that the political party has a First Amendment freedom of association
that includes the right not to associate with those candidates they deem
ideologically outside the party.5 Aside from having the support of law,6
theoretical justification for this proposition exists. The purpose of polit-
ical parties is to advance the shared beliefs of their members and con-
vert often diffuse beliefs into specific, responsive public decisions.7 One
way political parties advance shared beliefs is to select candidates rep-
resenting those shared beliefs to run in a general election." If those can-
didates can attract sufficient popular support to be elected, the
candidates can effectuate the political parties' interests.9
American political parties, however, are not ideologically mono-
lithic. In fact, Justice Powell characterized them as having "a fluidity
and overlap of philosophy and membership."10 Political parties do not
win elections by converting voters into adherents of their entire plat-
form, but by forging coalitions with competing interests in the hopes of
attracting more voters than the coalition put together by the opposing
party." As a result, political parties often develop vague and overlap-
ping programs that do not offer the voter sharply different choices. 2
3. In 1992, the well-known candidates for the Democratic nomination were Edmund G.
Brown, Bill Clinton, Tom Harkin, Robert Kerry, and Paul Tsongas. The lesser-known Eugene
McCarthy, Larry Agran, and Lyndon LaRouche also sought the party's nomination. The well-
known Republican candidates were President George Bush and Pat Buchanan. However, the
lesser-known Emmanuel Branch, Harold E. Stassen, and the not-as-well-liked David Duke also
sought the Republican nomination. See McCarthy v. Elections Bd., 480 N.W.2d 241, 243-44 (Wis.
1992) (discussing the Wisconsin Ballot).
4. See generally Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992); Duke v. Smith, 784 F.
Supp. 865 (S.D. Fla. 1992); LaRouche v. Hannah, 822 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1992); McCarthy, 480
N.W.2d at 241.
5. See, for example, Duke, 954 F.2d at 1530-31.
6. See text accompanying notes 27-30.
7. See generally Everett Carll Ladd, Where Have All the Voters Gone? The Fracturing of
America's Political Parties xxi (Norton, 2d ed. 1982).
8. Julia E. Guttman, Note, Primary Elections and the Collective Right of Freedom of Asso-
ciation, 94 Yale L. J. 117, 123 (1984) ("Guttman article"). See also Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S.
51, 58 (1973) (stating that the basic function of political parties is to select candidates to run in
general elections).
9. Guttman article at 123.
10. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 769 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting).





Political parties often do not have a single ideology accepted by all
members. Therefore, one could argue that the leaders of political par-
ties have no unique insight that would allow them to discern accurately
which candidates are ideologically outside the party.
The First Amendment limits the power of government to interfere
with political parties' choice to exercise their freedom of association. 3
The Supreme Court has held that states cannot interfere with a party's
selection of its candidates during the primary election process absent a
compelling interest.14 Consequently, direct state interference in a
party's candidate selection process is unconstitutional.1
5
This Recent Development analyzes Duke v. Cleland.6 In Duke, the
court addressed an action brought by David Duke, a former member of
the Ku Klux Klan, Nazi party, and National Association for the Ad-
vancement of White People, against Max Cleland, the Georgia Secre-
tary of State and chair of the Presidential Candidate Selection
Committee. 17 Duke brought the suit because his name was removed
from the Georgia Presidential Preference Primary Ballot by Republican
Party members of the state-created Presidential Candidate Selection
Committee. 8
This Recent Development analyzes the Eleventh Circuit's decision
and focuses on the state's involvement in Duke's exclusion from the pri-
mary ballot. Part II sets forth the legal background and an appropriate
framework of analysis. Part III summarizes the opinions of the majority
and dissent. Part IV analyzes the court's decision in light of relevant
case law and suggests that the court's analysis was flawed because
neither the majority nor the dissent considered the most important is-
sue-whether the state constitutionally can compel the Republican
Party to establish an elite Presidential Candidate Selection Committee
and confer upon the committee the power to remove otherwise qualified
candidates from the primary ballot.
13. See text accompanying notes 19-26.
14. See Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 385 Mass. 1201, 434 N.E.2d 960, 963 (1982)
(advisory opinion) (supporting the protection of a party's control over who its candidate in a gen-
eral election will be).
15. See text accompanying notes 20-26.
16. 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).





A. The First Amendment's Protection of the Right of Association
Although the word "association" is not contained in the text of the
First Amendment, the Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Alabama that
the First Amendment protects a positive right to work collectively with
others to pursue goals substantively protected by the First Amendment,
including political advocacy. 19 In Cousins v. Wigoda, the Court for the
first time explicitly held that political parties enjoy this constitutionally
protected freedom of association. 0
In Cousins, the Court confronted a situation in which the Demo-
cratic National Convention refused to seat a group of delegates elected
to represent the city of Chicago in the 1972 Illinois Democratic Primary
because the delegates were slated in a manner that violated party
guidelines.2 The Court held that state laws governing the electoral
processes do not take precedence over party rules governing the eligibil-
ity of delegates selected for the party's presidential nominating conven-
tion.2 2 After first asserting that political parties and their adherents
enjoy the First Amendment freedom of political association and noting
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects this right from infringement
by the states, 23 the Court applied the compelling interest test to deter-
mine if the state's interest in protecting the outcome of the votes cast
at the primary outweighed the party's constitutional guarantee of free
association. 4
The Court found that the state's interest failed to meet the com-
pelling interest test because the states have no constitutionally man-
19. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In addition, the Court has held that it is unconstitutional for a
governmental practice or policy to interfere with or discourage a group's pursuit of ends having
special First Amendment significance, such as literary expression or religious worship. See Lau-
rence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-26 at 1013-14 (Foundation, 2d ed. 1988)
("Tribe hornbook").
20. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
21. Id. at 478-79. A group of challengers contested the elected delegates' right to be seated at
the Democratic National Convention because the slate of the elected delegates was assembled in
violation of new party guidelines, requiring more open access to meetings and affirmative action in
the delegate selection process. Id. at 479. See also Arthur M. Weisburd, Candidate-Making and
the Constitution: Constitutional Restraints on and Protections of Party Nominating Methods, 57
S. Cal. L. Rev. 213, 225 (1984) ("Weisburd article").
The National Party Credentials Committee recommended seating the challengers instead of
the elected delegates. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 480-81. The elected delegates sued in state court and
received an injunction prohibiting the challengers from taking on roles as delegates. Despite the
injunction, the Democratic National Convention seated the challengers. Id. at 481.
22. Id. at 483.
23. Id. at 487.
24. Id. at 489.
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dated role in the selection of candidates for President and Vice
President, which is the primary purpose of the nominating conven-
tion.25 Consequently, the party seated the challengers in place of the
elected delegates even though they were not elected under the laws of
that state.26
The Court also has recognized that the First Amendment freedom
of association protects the right not to associate with others. The Court
recently specified how this "negative" right applies to political parties
in Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin.2 7 In Democratic
Party, the Court held that the National Democratic Party could refuse
to seat delegates selected in a Wisconsin open primary. Wisconsin state
law required state delegates to vote at the national convention in accor-
dance with the results of the open primary,2 8 while the rules of the Na-
tional Democratic Party state that only registered Democrats may
participate in delegate selection procedures, including primaries. 2 9 By
allowing the party to refuse to seat delegates, the Court upheld the
party's freedom not to associate. The Court concluded that the party's
freedom to associate for the common advancement of political beliefs
included the freedom to identify those members who constitute the as-
sociation and to limit the association to those people only. 0 Therefore,
the National Democratic Party constitutionally could refuse to seat del-
egates selected by non-party members.
Additionally, the Court limited the extent to which the state can
interfere with a political party's First Amendment freedom to associate
with independent voters. In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecti-
cut,3 the Court invalidated a state law requiring voters in a political
party's primary to be registered members of that party.3 2 The state Re-
publican Party had a contrary rule allowing independent voters to vote
in its party primaries.3 The Court held that the state law was unconsti-
tutional" because it denied the party the right to govern the selection
of its candidates, despite the state's legitimate interests in ensuring the
25. Id. at 489-90.
26. Id. at 491.
27. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
28. Id. at 122-24. In an open primary, the state does not require a voter to declare publicly a
party preference or to have that preference publicly recorded. Thus, a registered voter in an open
primary state may vote in the primary of either party. See id. at 112 n.4.
29. Id. at 109.
30. Id. at 122.
31. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
32. Id. at 210-11.
33. Id. at 210.
34. Id. at 229.
1993] 1595
1596 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1591
orderly administration of primaries, preventing voter raiding, avoiding
voter confusion, and protecting the integrity of the two-party system. 5
The Supreme Court also has invalidated state statutes that signifi-
cantly interfere with a party's freedom to structure itself internally. In
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,6 the
Court struck down a California statute that prohibited party leaders
from making primary endorsements and restricted the party's latitude
to organize itself internally on the grounds that the statute deprived the
political parties and their members of the rights of free speech and free
association. 7
.In Eu, the Court stated that laws burdening the rights of political
parties and their members can be upheld only if they advance a com-
pelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to serve that interest,
establishing a strict level of scrutiny.38 The Court then addressed the
statute's ban on primary endorsements. After holding that the ban was
unconstitutional because it prohibited purely political speech,3 9 the
Court also found it infringed on the party's constitutional guarantee of
free association 40 because it burdened the party's right to identify peo-
ple who are members of the party and select a standard bearer who best
represented the party's ideologies and preferences.41
In response, the State argued that the ban was necessary to ensure
a stable political system. Although the Court accepted the State's pro-
position that the maintenance of a stable political system is a compel-
ling state interest,42 the Court held that the statute was not narrowly
tailored to serve this interest because the State could not explain ade-
quately how banning parties from opposing or supporting primary can-
didates advanced this state interest.43 The State argued that this
statute embraced a similar compelling interest in party stability, but
35. Id. at 217.
36. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
37. Id. at 224, 233. A provision of the California Election Code forbade the official governing
bodies of political parties from endorsing candidates in party primaries, dictated the size and com-
position of the state central committees, set forth rules governing the selection and removal of
committee members, fixed the maximum term of office for the chair of the state central committee,
required that the chair rotate between residents of northern and southern California, specified the
time and place of committee meetings, and limited the dues parties could impose on their mem-
bers. Id. at 216-19.
38. Id. at 222.
39. Id. at 222-24.
40. Id. at 224.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 226.
43. Id.
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the Court rejected this justification as well, noting that a primary is an
ideal place to resolve interparty feuds.
4
4
Additionally, the Court held that the organizational restraints im-
posed by the statutes impermissibly burdened the associational rights
of political parties and their members because they limited the parties'
discretion in deciding how to organize themselves, conduct their affairs,
and select their leaders." The Court then distinguished this interfer-
ence from laws it previously had upheld, such as statutes requiring pri-
mary voters to have residence in the state and be a certain age in order
to vote.46 According to the Court, these statutes burdened the associa-
tional rights of parties to garner support and members, yet served a
compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the election process
because these statutes ensured that elections were fair and honest.
47
The organizational restrictions struck down in Eu, however, were unre-
lated to preservation of the integrity of the election process and directly
regulated the composition of the party leadership, unlike the restric-
tions upheld in prior cases.48
The cases discussed above suggest that any time a state substitutes
its discretion for that of the political party, it infringes upon that
party's associational interests.49 Thus, when a state substantially erodes
party members' freedom of association, the Court will subject these acts
to strict scrutiny.50
B. The State Action Requirement
The First and Fourteenth Amendments regulate only the behavior
of the government, not private conduct.5 1 Therefore, voters and candi-
dates who assert that a political party is denying them their freedom to
associate with it must establish that the political party is a state actor
to mount a meaningful constitutional challenge.2 Under the older view
of state action, in which private entities that performed public func-
tions were deemed to be state actors, the Court found state action to
44. Id. at 227. The State also argued that the endorsement ban was necessary to protect
voters from confusion and undue influence. Id. at 228. The Court rejected this argument on the
grounds that restricting the flow of information does not help voters make good decisions and
because the state presented no evidence that the ban was necessary to prevent fraud and corrup-
tion. Id. at 228-29.
45. Id. at 230.
46. Id. at 231 (citing Dunn v. Blurnstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972)); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 118. (1970).
47. Eu, 489 U.S. at 231.
48. Id. at 231-32.
49. See Tribe hornbook § 13-22 at 1112-18 (cited in note 19).
50. Id.
51. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
52. See Tribe hornbook § 13-23 at 1118-21 (cited in note 19).
1993] 1597
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exist when political parties took on official electoral roles pursuant to
state law. 3
The earliest cases in which the Supreme Court held that political
parties' nominating functions constituted state action were the White
Primary cases, in which black voters challenged the parties' refusal to
allow them to vote. In Nixon v. Herndon,55 the Court struck down a
Texas statute that prohibited blacks from voting in party primaries on
the grounds that the statute was a direct and obvious infringement of
the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Al-
though in this case the Court did not address the issue of state action
because the state statute mandated the challenged discrimination, the
Court has found state action to exist when a political party takes a par-
ticular course of action explicitly permitted by a state statute.57
For example, in Nixon v. Condon,"8 black voters challenged a pol-
icy adopted by the Democratic Party of Texas that barred blacks from
voting in party primaries.5 9 The Court held that the party's rule consti-
tuted state action because a state statute gave the committee power to
proclaim voter qualifications for the party.60 The Court then struck
down the policy on the grounds that it violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.6
Condon and the other White Primary cases that followed 2 marked
the beginning of the public function approach to analyzing state action.
In these cases, the Court reasoned that because the entire electoral pro-
cess is a public function, a political party entrusted by the state to per-
form electoral duties becomes an agent of the state and its acts
constitute state action. 3
53. Weisburd article at 216 (cited in note 21).
54. See text accompanying notes 55-63.
55, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
56. Id. at 541.
57. See Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 82. The Democratic Party disqualified these voters pursuant to a state law enacted
after Herndon, wlich allowed the executive committees of political parties to establish voter quali-
fications. Id.
60. Id. at 88-89.
61. Id. at 89. According to Professor Tribe, the White Primary cases also suggest that politi-
cal party activities that are part of the candidate selection process are deemed state action because
the nominee of that party will receive some preferential state treatment. Tribe hornbook § 13-23
at 1119 (cited in note 19).
62. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1962).
63. Smith, 321 U.S. 649 (holding that a rule adopted by the state convention of the Texas
Democratic Party that prohibited non-whites from voting in party primaries violated the Fifteenth
Amendment and finding state action in the fact that the running of primaries is a governmental
function and an integral part of the election process); Terry, 345. U.S. 461 (holding that a racially
1598 [Vol. 46:1591
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Under the Court's current doctrinal approach to state action, the
activity must be one that was traditionally under the exclusive domain
of the government.14 Under this approach, nominating procedures of
political parties generally are not state action because governmental
nomination of political candidates is antithetical to the norms of Ameri-
can democracy.6 5 If, however, a particular nominating procedure is re-
quired by a statute, state action obviously is present, and no formal
inquiry into the matter is required.6 This was the situation in Duke
because in Georgia, a detailed statute allowed a state-created commit-
tee to remove candidates from the Republican and Democratic presi-
dential primary ballots.
6 7
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENT: DUKE V. CLELAND
A. Facts
On December 4, 1991, David Duke announced his candidacy for the
Republican nomination for President of the United States. 8 Georgia
law required that the state Democratic and Republican parties hold a
presidential preference primary in 1992.69
To appear on the Georgia ballot, candidates need not gather signa-
tures of party members, but news media throughout the United States
generally must advocate or recognize candidates as both aspirants for
that office and members of a political party or body that conducts a
presidential preference primary.70 Georgia law required the Secretary of
State to prepare a list of the candidates who met the statutory qualifi-
cations and submit the list to the statutorily established Presidential
Candidate Selection Committee.7' In December 1991, Secretary of State
restrictive election held by the Jaybird Democratic Association was state action because the state
had allowed this unofficial pre-primary to usurp the role of the official Democratic primary).
64. In Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419'U.S. 345 (1974), the Court rejected an argument
that the termination of electric service by a privately owned public utility was state action. It held
that the act of providing electric power was not a public function. Id. at 352. The Court limited the
public function doctrine to situations in which private entities perform functions "traditionally
exclusively reserved to the State." Id.
65. See id.
66. See Tribe hornbook § 18-1 at 1688 (cited in note 19) (stating that when the validity of a
statute is at issue in a particular case, no further inquiry into the existence of state action is
required).
67. Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-193 (Michie, 1987) ("O.C.G.A.").
68. Duke v. Cleland, 954 F.2d 1526, 1527 (11th Cir. 1992).
69. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-191 (Michie, 1987 and Supp. 1992).
70. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193(a) (Michie, 1987).
71. Id.
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Max Cleland, conforming to the Georgia statute, submitted a list of as-
pirants, including David Duke, to the Committee.72
Georgia law also allowed the Committee members of a political
party to remove a candidate's name from its party's ballot by unani-
mous agreement.73 In December 1991, all three Republican Committee
members7 4 agreed to remove Duke's name from the ballot.75 Pursuant
to Georgia law, Duke then made a written request to the Secretary of
State that his name be reinstated on the ballot.7 If any member of the
Committee then had wanted Duke's name to appear on the primary
ballot, the statute required the Secretary of State to include it. 7 No
Republican member of the Committee, however, requested that the
Secretary of State place Duke's name on the ballot.
7s
On January 15, 1992, Duke, along with three persons registered and
qualified to vote in Georgia Republican primary elections, 79 brought an
action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Georgia. They sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction to prevent the Committee from excluding David Duke from
the 1992 Georgia Republican presidential preference primary ballot.80
The district court denied the motions, holding that the plaintiffs did
not meet the burden of proof required for granting a preliminary in-
junction.8 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed the decision of the district court and concluded that the plain-
72. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1527.
73. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193(a) provides in pertinent part: "Each person designated by the Secre-
tary of State as a presidential candidate shall appear upon the ballot of the appropriate political
party or body unless all committee members of the same political party or body as the candidate
agree to delete such candidate's name from the ballot."
74. The Presidential Candidate Selection Committee is composed of Georgia's Secretary of
State, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the majority leader of the Senate, the minority
leaders of both the House and the Senate, and the chairpersons of both the Democratic and Re-
publican parties. The Secretary of State is the Committee's nonvoting chairperson. O.C.G.A. § 21-
2-193(a).
75. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1527.
76. Id. at 1528. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193(b) allows the removed candidate to request that his
name be reinstated on the ballot.
77. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1528.
78. Id.
79. Apparently, these voters were made parties to the suit so that the appellants would have
standing to argue that the Committee's action infringed upon their voting rights. Id. at 1531.
80. Duke v. Cleland, 783 F. Supp. 600, 601 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
81. Id. Specifically, the court considered whether: (1) a substantial likelihood existed that the
plaintiffs ultimately would prevail on the merits; (2) the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury
unless the injunction issued; (3) the threatened injury to the movants outweighed whatever dam-
age the proposed injunction might have caused the opponent; and (4) the injunction, if issued,
would not be adverse to the public interest. Id.
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tiffs' claims that the committee's action denied them their freedom of
association and right to vote were without merit.8 2
B. Majority Opinion
A divided three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, which would have
prevented the Secretary of State from excluding David Duke from the
primary ballot.8 3 After concluding that the controversy was not moot,
even though the ballots already had gone to the printer without Duke's
name on them,84 the majority stated that it was unsure what constitu-
tional standard of scrutiny to apply, but concluded that even under
strict scrutiny Duke was unlikely to prevail.8 5
The first substantive issue the court considered was whether the
Committee's decision to exclude Duke from the ballot infringed upon
his freedom of association.8 Based on dicta from Democratic Party
7
and Tashjian,"s the majority concluded that the Committee's action did
not infringe on Duke's freedom of association." The majority first
stated that in those two cases the Supreme Court recognized a freedom
of association belonging to the party that includes the right to limit its
membership to those who the party thinks share its collective beliefs.90
The court then concluded that Duke had no right to associate with the
party because the party has the freedom not to associate with Duke.9 '
The second issue the majority addressed was whether the decision
of the Committee burdened the voters' Fight to vote.2 Although the
majority recognized that the right to vote is fundamental, 93 it found
that the specific right to vote was not at issue in this case because the
appellants could vote for Duke as an independent or third-party candi-
82. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1533.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1528-29. The court concluded that the controversy was not moot for two reasons.
First, the appellees did not demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that it was too late for Duke's
name to appear on the ballot or for other appropriate relief to be granted. Id. at 1529. Second, the
court feared that "[t]here would be every reason to expect the same parties to generate a similar,
future controversy subject to identical time constraints if [it] should fail to resolve the constitu-
tional issues that arose in [1992]." Id. (quoting Norman v. Reed, 112 S. Ct. 698 (1992)).
85. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1530.
86. Id.
87. 450 U.S. 107 (1981). See text accompanying notes 27-30.
88. 479 U.S. 208 (1986). See text accompanying notes 31-35.
89. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1531.
90. Id. at 1530.
91. Id. at 1531.
92. Id. Although the case was styled Duke v. Cleland, Duke was joined by three persons
registered and qualified to vote in the 1992 primary who wished to have the opportunity to vote for
Duke. See id. at 1528 n.3.
93. Id. at 1531 (citing Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)).
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date in the general election.9 4 After deciding that the voters' absolute
right to vote for Duke for President in the general election was not in-
fringed, the majority proceeded to evaluate the countervailing state in-
terests that may have justified burdening this lesser-protected right to
vote specifically for Duke in the primary.9 5
The court again noted that the Supreme Court has long recognized
political parties' right to exclude those whose ideologies they deem to
be in conflict with those of the party. 6 The court then analogized the
burden on the appellants' right to vote to the burden placed on voters
by the Supreme Court's holding in Democratic Party, which the Elev-
enth Circuit majority characterized as permitting the party to exclude
all voters who were not members of the Democratic Party from the
party primary.9 7 Without explaining why a party's interest in protecting
itself from intrusion by persons with contrary views is a state interest,
the majority concluded that such an interest justified burdening the
right to vote and excluding Duke from the primary ballot. 8
C. The Dissent
The dissent agreed with the majority that Duke does not have a
right to associate with those who do not wish to associate with him. 9 It,
however, would have reversed the district court's denial of injunctive
relief.
First, the dissent argued that the exclusion of Duke heavily bur-
dened the voters' right to vote. 00 Citing Lubin v. Panish,10' the dissent
argued that the right to vote is not limited to considerations of voters'
access to the ballot, but also includes their access to alternative view-
points and positions presented on the ballot. 02 Second, the dissent as-
serted that the Committee's removal of Duke from the ballot "affected"
the right of Duke and his supporters to associate for the advancement
of their shared political beliefs. 03 Third, the dissent stressed that al-
though the right to seek party nomination or political office is not a
fundamental right, state action affecting candidate ballot access rights
94. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1531.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1532.
98. Id. at 1532-33.
99. Id. at 1535.
100. Id.
101. 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). In Lubin, the Court held that the Constitution prohibits a
state from requiring an indigent candidate for public office to pay filing fees that he cannot afford
to pay without providing alternative means. Id. at 717-18.




should be subject to. heightened scrutiny when the restriction unjustifi-
ably burdens the availability of political opportunity.
1 04
The dissent then evaluated the extent of the burden placed upon
the rights of Duke and his supporters. 0 5 Based on its views about the
realities of the two-party primary system and reliance on the Supreme
Court's statement in Anderson v. Celebreeze'0 6 that the opportunity to
run as a write-in candidate "is not an adequate substitute for having
one's name printed on the ballot,'107 the dissent found the burden sig-
nificant notwithstanding the fact that voters could support Duke as a
third-party or write-in candidate. 08
Finally, the dissent applied the compelling interest test and found
that the state failed to demonstrate a compelling interest that justified
Duke's exclusion. 10 The dissent noted that the majority's analysis
begged the question of whether the preservation of the right of the Re-
publican Party not to associate with Duke is a compelling state
interest.1 0
According to the dissent, however, even if the state had demon-
strated a compelling interest, the state action was not narrowly tailored
to serve the alleged compelling governmental interest, and therefore
failed the compelling interest test."' The state action was not narrowly
tailored because including Duke on the ballot would not force any un-
desired association between Duke and the party because no one is re-
quired to vote for him and the party is free to campaign against him,
urging voters to defeat him in the polls."' The dissent reasoned that
because the Supreme Court in Eu struck down as unconstitutional a
law prohibiting party officials from endorsing or campaigning for partic-
ular candidates in the primary, the Court, by implication, recognized
that candidates who were disfavored by the party leaders should be
permitted to participate, even if unsuccessfully, in the primary
process."'
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court cases of Cousins, Democratic Party, Eu, and
Tashjian held that political parties and their members have a freedom
104. Id. at 1536.
105. Id.
106. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
107. Id. at 799 n.26.
108. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1536-37.




113. Id. at 1538.
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of association granted by the First Amendment that allows them to de-
termine their organizational structure, endorse candidates, and set re-
quirements for voter participation in their primaries." 4 These cases also
held that a state must have a compelling governmental interest to jus-
tify any interference with these constitutionally protected activities.115
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the par-
ties asserting their First Amendment right to free association without
state interference. The Court's consistent emphasis on upholding this
right, along with a careful reading of the facts presented in Duke, sug-
gests that the most important question presented by this case is
whether the state of Georgia constitutionally can compel the Republi-
can Party to establish an elite Presidential Candidate Selection Com-
mittee and confer upon the Committee the power to remove otherwise
qualified candidates from the primary ballot. The majority and dissent
ignored this critical question.
If the Republican Party, through its machinery, created and con-
ferred such authority on the Committee absent a state mandate, then
the majority would have been correct in concluding that the associa-
tional rights of Duke and his supporters were not violated when the
Committee removed Duke's name from the ballot. 6 The Court has
found that a political party is permitted to make decisions concerning
114. See text accompanying notes 20-48.
115. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 479, 489 (1975); Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 124; Eu
v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231 (1989); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at
217.
116. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191 (1979). In Marchioro, the Court held that a
Washington statute requiring each major political party to have a state committee consisting of
two persons from each county in the state did not violate the party's freedom of association. Id. at
199. The statute conferred upon the committee the power to call conventions, provide for the
election of delegates to national conventions, fill vacancies on the ticket, provide for the nomina-
tion of presidential electors, and perform all functions inherent in such an organization. Id. at 192
n.1. The charter of the state Democratic Party gave the state committee the authority to organize
and administer the party's administrative apparatus, fundraise for candidates, conduct workshops,
instruct candidates on effective campaign procedures and organization, and further the party's
objectives of influencing policy and electing adherents to office. Id. at 193.
The State Democratic Party argued that the statute was unconstitutional because statutory
restrictions on the composition of the committee, which under the party's charter was assigned the
functions of a purely internal governing body, violated its freedom of association. Id. at 194, 197.
The party members did not argue that the functions statutorily assigned to the committee imper-
missibly infringed upon the party's freedom of association. Id. at 198-99. Consequently, the Court
held that the party could not claim that the statute infringed upon its right to govern itself, an
argument derived from its First Amendment freedom of association, because the source of the
complaint was the party's own decision to confer the authority to make purely internal decisions
on the state committee. Id. at 199.
In Eu, the Court distinguished Marchioro by noting that unlike the Washington statute, the
California Code provision, not the party's charter, assigned the statutorily-mandated committee
the internal governance task of conducting the party's campaigns. Eu, 489 U.S. at 232 n.22. The
Georgia statute at issue in Duke is analogous to the California election provision struck down in
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its internal governance.11 Thus, the correct characterization of the facts
of this case would have been that the Party, on its own volition, estab-
lished a Presidential Candidate Selection Committee and bestowed
upon it the power to remove candidates from the primary ballot. As a
result, the Committee's use of party-bestowed discretion to remove
Duke would have constituted the Party's exercise of its own freedom of
association in choosing not to associate with Duke, and the Party's in-
ternal decisionmaking process would have defeated Duke.
If this characterization of the facts was correct, Georgia, in compos-
ing a ballot absent Duke's name, merely would have accepted the result
of the Party's own decisionmaking process. Absent a statute compelling
the party to create or follow the decisions of the Committee, no state
action would have precipitated Duke's removal and Duke would not
have had a cause of action because the Constitution limits the actions
of governments, not private groups.1 8
The facts of Duke, however, are very different from the scenario
described above. A state statute created the Committee and mandated
that the Republican Party clear its candidates with this Committee.11 9
Because a statute requires the Republican Party to create the Commit-
tee and accept its decisions, state action clearly exists in the candidate
selection process. 2" The removal of Duke by the state-created Commit-
tee thus interfered with the ability of party members to support the
candidate of their choice.
Eu suggests that this interference in a party's internal structure
and decisionmaking process is an unconstitutional infringement of the
party's freedom of association. In Eu, a unanimous Supreme Court 12'
struck down parts of the California Election Code that prohibited party
leaders from endorsing primary candidates and required political par-
ties to conform to a specific organizational structure. 2 The Court ex-
plained that one of the reasons for striking down the Code provision
prohibiting primary endorsements by party leaders was that the ban
impermissibly burdened the party's First Amendment freedom to or-
ganize itself, identify its members, and select a standard bearer who
best represented the party's ideologies and preferences. 23
Eu because the statute is the sole source of the Presidential Selection Committee's existence and
authority to remove candidates from the primary ballot.
117. Eu, 489 U.S. at 229-30.
118. See text accompanying notes 51-53.
119. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193(a) (Michie, 1987).
120. Tribe hornbook § 18-1 at 1688 (cited in note 19).
121. The decision was 8-0. Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case. Eu, 489 U.S. at 214.
122. See text accompanying notes 36-41.
123. Eu, 489 U.S. at 224.
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This Georgia election statute similarly infringes upon the Republi-
can Party's freedom of association. First, the statute interferes with the
Party's ability to devise its own internal structure because it mandates
the establishment of the Presidential Candidate Selection Committee
and specifies its membership and duties. Second, the statute conveys
upon the Committee the sole and final authority to decide which candi-
dates may appear on the ballot. Therefore, the statute burdens the abil-
ity of party members to vote for a candidate who most closely
represents their ideals and beliefs.
In concluding that the Republican Party's exclusion of Duke was
an appropriate exercise of the party's freedom not to associate with per-
sons who do not share the party's political beliefs, the majority relied
heavily on Democratic Party.2 4 The majority based this reliance on its
conclusion that the burdens placed on nonmembers' right to vote in
Democratic Party1 5 were analogous to those placed on the appellants'
right to vote in Duke.2 This analogy has no foundation.
As a preliminary matter, the majority mischaracterized Democratic
Party as a case about voting rights. In Democratic Party, however, the
Supreme Court held that the National Democratic Party's freedom of
association required the party's rule 27 to prevail over any state inter-
ests in assuring that the delegates elected in the open primary were
seated. 28 The right to vote was not an issue addressed by the Court in
that case.
129
Furthermore, Democratic Party, standing alone, and viewed in the
context of other Supreme Court decisions dealing with the associational
rights of political parties, does not support the majority's conclusion
that the exclusion of Duke because of his political beliefs was a legiti-
mate exercise of the Party's freedom of association. Although the ma-
jority accurately stated that the Court in Democratic Party held that
political parties have an associational freedom to refuse to seat dele-
gates elected in violation of party rules, 30 the majority failed to recog-
nize the clear distinction between the facts of Democratic Party and
124. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1532-33.
125. In Democratic Party, the Court held that the National Democratic Party could refuse to
seat Wisconsin delegates elected in a primary open to nonmembers. Democratic Party of United
States v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107, 121-22 (1981).
126. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1532.
127. Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 124.
128. Id. at 126.
129. In fact, the Court summarily rejected all alleged voting-related compelling interests ad-
vanced by the state to justify its insistence that its delegates to the convention be seated. Id. at
124-25. The state asserted "a compelling interest in preserving the overall integrity of the election
process, providing secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing
harassment of voters." Id.
130. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1532.
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Duke. In Democratic Party, the members of the National Democratic
Party, speaking through their rules, chose to exercise their associational
rights by limiting participation in the delegate selection process to
members of the Party.131 In Duke, however, a state statute restricted
the ability of the party to exercise its freedom of association by estab-
lishing its own candidate selection rules. In addition, the Committee's
decision to remove Duke from the ballot interfered with the ability of
the party members to associate freely with a particular candidate solely
because the state-created Committee, of which two-thirds of the mem-
bers were state officials, found Duke unacceptable.
In Democratic Party, the Court held that the First Amendment
prohibits the state from mandating that a national party seat delegates
selected in an open primary because such a mandate would amount to
forcing an association between members of that party and nonmembers.
The decision of the majority in Duke contradicts the holding of Demo-
cratic Party and allows the state to interfere with party members' First
Amendment freedom to associate with Duke.
The majority's interpretation of Democratic Party is even more
suspect when read in light of Tashjian. The Supreme Court held in
Tashjian that a state statute prohibiting political parties from opening
their primaries to independent voters impermissibly burdened the
party's First Amendment guarantee of free association. 3 ' When applied
to the facts of Duke, Tashjian suggests that the Georgia statute, which
hinders the ability of party members to vote for the candidate of their
choice, also impermissibly interferes with the party's First Amendment
freedom of association. Read together, Democratic Party and Tashjian
support the proposition that the First Amendment protects political
parties' freedom to choose with whom they wish to associate in the pri-
mary election process.
The Duke majority clearly did not understand the implications of
Eu, Democratic Party, or Tashjian, and ignored the statute's interfer-
ence with the party's freedom of association. Instead, the majority first
hesitantly recited Supreme Court holdings in an unsuccessful attempt
to determine an appropriate level of scrutiny. 13 3 Then, the court ana-
lyzed the Committee's removal of Duke's name in light of a conspicu-
ously unasserted premise that the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the party's freedom to associate with persons of common po-
litical beliefs. 34 As noted by the dissent, the majority begged the ques-
131. Id.
132. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 229 (1986).
133. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1530-31.
134. Id. at 1529-33.
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tion of whether the preservation of the First Amendment right of the
Republican Party not to associate with Duke is a compelling state inter-
est."3 5 However, the dissent also failed to address the critical issue of
whether the state constitutionally can establish a Presidential Candi-
date Selection Committee and require the party to accept uncondition-
ally the Committee's decision to remove Duke from the ballot.
Perhaps the majority and dissent failed to address this critical is-
sue because the appellants failed to argue that the statute interfered
with the party's freedom of association.136 If Duke lost because his law-
yers did not brief the court adequately, his lawyers primarily are to
blame. Nonetheless, the court was aware of the possible constitutional
challenges that Duke could have brought against the statute, but re-
fused to address them directly. One reason why the court may have
avoided the issue of the statute's constitutionality was that Duke may
have lacked standing to challenge a statute that interfered with the
freedoms of the state Republican Party. Consequently, this case could
be read as a standing holding in disguise.
Even if Duke did not have third-party standing to assert the rights
of the party, the majority failed to consider the First Amendment rights
of the party members who wished to have the opportunity to vote for
Duke in the primary and joined Duke in this action. In Tashjian, the
Supreme Court asserted that a hypothetical state statute that restricted
the field of potential party nominees for public offices to party members
alone would infringe upon other party members' freedom to associate
with those who share their political goals. 37 The Georgia statute ig-
nored by the Duke majority similarly infringes on the freedom of party
members to associate with their political kin because the statutorily-
created Committee has the power to restrict the field of candidates.'3 8
Had the majority read Tashjian carefully, it would have discovered
that the Court distinguished situations in which the state interferes
with the ability of a party or its members to associate with nonmembers
in its primaries from situations in which a nonmember desires to associ-
ate with a party that does not want to associate with him.'39 The Tash-
135. Id. at 1537.
136. The majority noted that the appellants did not challenge the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute or assert that the Committee lacked the authority to speak for the Party. Id. at
1530 n.5.
137. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, stated: "Were the
State to... provide that only Party members might be selected as the Party's chosen nominees for
public office, such a prohibition of potential association with nonmembers would clearly infringe
upon the rights of the Party's members under the First Amendment to organize with like-minded
citizens in support of common political goals." Id.
138. O.C.G.A. § 21-2-193(a).
139. See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215 n.6.
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jian Court recognized that in this latter group, a party's exercise of its
freedom of association expressed through its membership qualifications
outweighs a nonmember's desire to participate in the party's affairs.1
40
The majority in Duke, however, mistakenly characterized Duke as a
case in which an outsider wanted to associate with an unwilling Repub-
lican Party.14 ' This characterization was erroneous because members of
the Republican Party joined with Duke in this cause of action because
they wished to support his candidacy for President.
142
V. CONCLUSION
Rank and file members of any political party that conducts presi-
dential primaries should be concerned with the outcome of Duke. The
Eleventh Circuit's inattention to the constitutional issue of whether a
state can compel a political party to establish an elite committee with
the power to screen out possible nominees before party members can do
so through the primary process sets bad precedent and renders presi-
dential primaries little more than rubber stamp endorsements of the
selections of these elite party committees. Future courts faced with sim-
ilar cases should recognize that the First Amendment protects the
rights of political parties to choose their own method of candidate selec-




141. Duke, 954 F.2d at 1531.
142. Id. at 1528 n.3. Because the Georgia Republican Presidential Primary is closed to non-
members, appellants Andrews, Gorton, and Manget, who the majority noted are registered and
qualified to vote in the primary, are by definition members of the party for the purpose of the
primary election.
* The Author would like to thank Professor Thomas McCoy of Vanderbilt Law School for his
assistance in preparation of this Note.
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